
Financing Climate Resilience in Pacific Island Nations: Fiscal Policy Solutions in the Wake of Shifting ODA and Multilateral Challenges

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ABSTRACT

Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDs) face escalating climate threats—rising sea levels, intensifying storms, and ecological decline—while a shifting funding landscape undermines their resilience. Official Development Assistance (ODA), a lifeline for PSIDs, is diminishing, with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) facing severe cuts under the Trump administration’s 2025 foreign aid freeze, slashing over 80% of its programs. This article investigates fiscal policy solutions to bolster climate resilience amid these challenges, focusing on green bonds, debt-for-climate swaps, domestic revenue mobilisation, and blended finance. Drawing on policy analysis and case studies from Fiji (green bonds), the Caribbean (debt swaps), and Micronesia (digital resilience in FSM, sustainable diversification in Palau), it evaluates their efficacy against declining ODA and multilateral hurdles, including geopolitical tensions and inefficiencies in institutions like the Asian Development Bank and Green Climate Fund. Leveraging data from the World Bank, United Nations, and regional frameworks like the Pacific Islands Forum, the study proposes enhanced multilateral cooperation and fiscal innovation to close the funding gap. It concludes with urgent recommendations to ensure PSIDs’ survival and sustainable development in a warming world.



I. Introduction

Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDs) stand at the forefront of the global climate crisis, grappling with existential threats that imperil their ecosystems, economies, and populations. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projects that under a high-emissions scenario (RCP8.5), sea-level

rise could inundate up to 80% of low-lying atolls across the Pacific by 2100, submerging critical infrastructure and displacing communities reliant on coastal resources.¹ For nations like Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM)—with populations ranging from 12,000 to 115,000—these risks are immediate and acute.² The

¹ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. *Sixth Assessment Report: Climate Change*. United Nations, 2022, at p. 15.

² “Pacific Islands Country Overview.” *World Bank Webpage*, 2023.

Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that PSIDS face annual economic losses from climate-related disasters averaging \$1.2 billion, equivalent to 4-8% of their collective GDP.³ Tropical cyclones, such as Cyclone Pam in 2015, which caused damages exceeding \$450 million in Vanuatu, underscore this vulnerability.⁴ Rising temperatures further threaten coral reefs, which support 25% of marine biodiversity and sustain fisheries contributing up to 10% of GDP in countries like Palau.⁵

Historically, Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been a cornerstone of PSIDS' resilience efforts, funding adaptation projects, infrastructure, and capacity building. In 2021, ODA accounted for 62% of total financing flows to Micronesia, a dependency mirrored across the region. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reports that PSIDS received \$2.8 billion in ODA annually from 2015 to 2020, with major donors including Australia, Japan, and the United States.⁶ However, this funding landscape is shifting dramatically. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), a key contributor, faces an existential crisis under the Trump administration's foreign aid policy, effective January 2025. On March 10, 2025, Marco Rubio announced an 83% termination of USAID programs, redirecting funds to domestic priorities, with Pacific allocations dropping from \$225 million in 2024 to an estimated \$40 million in 2025. This follows the 2023 renegotiation of the Compact of Free Association (COFA) agreements with FSM, Palau, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), which shifted some USAID responsibilities to the U.S. Department of the Interior, reducing direct aid by \$75 million

annually.⁷ While USAID maintains a presence—evidenced by its expanded Suva mission and \$50 million microfinance commitment in 2023—the 2025 cuts signal a broader ODA decline, exacerbating PSIDS' funding gap.⁸

This shortfall coincides with escalating climate adaptation costs. The ADB projects that PSIDS require \$1 billion annually through 2030 to fortify infrastructure, protect ecosystems, and enhance disaster resilience.⁹ The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) estimates that adaptation costs for small island states could reach \$4.7 billion per year by 2050 under current trajectories.¹⁰ Yet, multilateral mechanisms meant to bridge this gap—such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF), World Bank (WB), and ADB—face significant challenges. The GCF, established to support climate action in developing nations, disbursed \$187 million to Pacific countries between 2015 and 2022, but only 15% of PSIDS' funding proposals were approved due to bureaucratic hurdles and capacity constraints.¹¹ Geopolitical tensions further complicate coordination. China's Belt and Road Initiative has injected \$1.3 billion in concessional loans to Pacific infrastructure since 2013, often at interest rates exceeding 2%, raising debt sustainability concerns.¹² The Lowy Institute notes that US-China rivalry has fragmented aid efforts, with overlapping projects—like duplicate port developments in Vanuatu—undermining efficiency.¹³ The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), a regional body, struggles to harmonise these competing interests, with its 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent lacking enforceable funding commitments.¹⁴

³ "Pacific Economic Monitor." *Asian Development Bank Webpage*, 2021.

⁴ "Vanuatu: Post-Disaster Needs Assessment." *World Bank*, 2016.

⁵ "Global Coral Reef Status Report." *United Nations Environment Programme*, 2022.

⁶ "Development Co-operation Report: Pacific Islands." *OECD*, 2022.

⁷ "Compact of Free Association Agreements: 2023 Update." *US Department of State*, 2023.

⁸ "Pacific Islands Strategy Report." *USAID*, 2023.

⁹ ADB (n 3) *supra*.

¹⁰ "Finance for Adaptation in Small Island States." *UNFCCC*, 2023.

¹¹ "Pacific Funding Portfolio: 2015-2022." *Green Climate Fund*, 2023.

¹² Zhan, James, et al. *World Investment Report 2022*. United Nations, 2022.

¹³ "Pacific Aid Map 2022." *Lowy Institute Webpage*, 2022.

¹⁴ *2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent*. Pacific Islands Forum, 2021.

Amid these challenges, PSIDS' reliance on external financing—averaging 50-60% of sectoral budgets—highlights the urgency of alternative solutions. Digital transformation offers a synergistic approach to climate resilience, enhancing disaster preparedness and economic diversification. As many experts argue, connectivity is a “force multiplier” for development, a principle evident in FSM's Pacific Regional Connectivity Program. Funded by the WB at \$47 million, this initiative expanded broadband access across FSM's 607 islands, enabling real-time cyclone warnings that reduced response times by 30% during 2022's Typhoon Nanmadol.¹⁵ Similarly, Palau's Digital Residency Program, leveraging blockchain technology, attracted \$2 million in foreign investment by 2024, bolstering economic resilience against climate shocks.¹⁶ This paper contends that innovative fiscal policies—green bonds, debt-for-climate swaps, domestic revenue mobilisation, and blended finance—coupled with reformed multilateral mechanisms, can address this funding crisis and enhance climate resilience. Green bonds, successfully piloted in Fiji with \$50 million raised in 2017 for renewable energy,¹⁷ offer a model for market-based financing. Debt-for-climate swaps, as implemented in the Caribbean, could redirect \$1.5 billion in debt servicing to adaptation projects.¹⁸ Domestic revenue strategies, such as Kiribati's fisheries licensing fees, generating \$130 million annually,¹⁹ demonstrate untapped potential. Blended finance, combining public and private capital, has mobilised \$300 million for Pacific renewable energy since 2018.²⁰ Multilateral reform, including streamlined GCF access and PIF-led coordination, is equally critical to align these tools with PSIDS' needs.

The objective of this study is to explore how fiscal policy solutions and multilateral mechanisms can strengthen climate resilience in PSIDS amidst declining ODA and coordination challenges, aligning with

Sustainable Development Goal 13 (Climate Action). Climate resilience is defined as the capacity to adapt to and mitigate climate impacts while sustaining socio-economic systems.²¹ Building on prior analyses of regional financing, this paper offers a comprehensive framework to address the crisis. It is structured across five Sections: Section 2 examines the shifting funding landscape and PSIDS' climate vulnerabilities, synthesising historical ODA trends and current multilateral dynamics; Section 3 evaluates fiscal policy solutions—green bonds, debt swaps, revenue mobilisation, and blended finance—through policy analysis and methodology; Section 4 presents case studies from Fiji, the Caribbean, and Micronesia, alongside strategies for regional cooperation via bodies like the PIF; and Section 5 delivers conclusions and actionable recommendations for policymakers, donors, and multilateral institutions. By integrating fiscal innovation with multilateral reform, this study aims to chart a sustainable path for PSIDS, ensuring their survival and prosperity in an era of climate uncertainty and funding upheaval.

II. The Shifting Funding Landscape and Climate Vulnerabilities

Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) face a volatile financing landscape, with contracting Official Development Assistance (ODA) and multilateral inefficiencies threatening their ability to address escalating climate vulnerabilities. This Section analyses ODA's evolving role, multilateral coordination challenges, and their interplay with climate risks, drawing on World Bank, OECD, and regional data to highlight the need for equitable financing solutions. PSIDS' climate vulnerabilities—driven by recurrent natural disasters and ecosystem degradation—heighten the urgency for equitable climate finance to bridge adaptation deficits. Small states like Kiribati and Tuvalu, with

¹⁵ *Pacific Regional Connectivity Program: Impact Assessment*. World Bank, 2022.

¹⁶ “Digital Innovations for Climate Resilience.” *United Nations Environment Programme*, 2023.

¹⁷ *Fiji Green Bond Impact Report*. International Finance Corporation, 2018.

¹⁸ “Debt-for-Climate Swaps in Small Island States.” *International Monetary Fund*, 2022.

¹⁹ “Kiribati Economic Update 2023.” *World Bank*, 2023.

²⁰ ADB (n 3) *supra*.

²¹ “Climate Resilience Framework.” *United Nations Development Programme*, 2021.

populations below 121,000, face fiscal constraints that limit responses to escalating climate risks, exacerbated by modest economies and remote geographies.²² These structural barriers inflate adaptation costs, with tax revenues averaging 18% of GDP compared to 34% in developing nations, restricting fiscal policy options.²³ Atteridge and Canales contend that PSIDS are marginalised in global climate finance, securing less than 5% of adaptation funds due to donor biases favoring larger economies, a disparity that amplifies funding gaps as aid declines.²⁴ For instance, Tuvalu's ODA dropped from \$25 million in 2020 to \$15 million in 2024, constraining its \$50 million coastal protection budget.²⁵ Donner et al. further note that such inequities force reliance on volatile external finance, underscoring the need for tailored mechanisms to address PSIDS' unique risks.²⁶

Historically, ODA has been a cornerstone of PSIDS' climate adaptation, financing disaster recovery and resilient infrastructure. From 2015 to 2020, it dominated adaptation budgets, supporting initiatives like digital connectivity enhancements in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) to bolster disaster preparedness. Yet, ODA allocation is uneven; Fiji, leveraging its larger economy, captured 40% of climate-related aid, while smaller states like Nauru secured under 5%, reflecting donor preferences for scalability.²⁷ Nakhooda et al. argue that ODA's project-driven approach often prioritises short-term recovery over systemic resilience, a flaw evident in post-cyclone rebuilding those neglects long-term adaptation.²⁸ Bermeo

further notes that this dependency, rooted in PSIDS' limited fiscal autonomy, heightens vulnerability to aid volatility, amplifying the need for diversified financing.²⁹

The financing landscape faces significant disruption, with ODA to PSIDS contracting sharply due to post-COVID reallocations and shifting donor priorities. The US's 2025 aid policy, effective January 2025, slashed Pacific funding by nearly 80%, including cuts to Compact of Free Association agreements with FSM, Palau, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, limiting resources for adaptation.³⁰ Australia's commitments, increasingly security-focused, divert funds from climate resilience. For example, Australia's 2025 budget redirected \$100 million from climate adaptation to maritime security in the Pacific, reducing PSIDS' resilience funding by 15%.³¹ Donner et al. argue that this volatility narrows fiscal space, forcing PSIDS to prioritise immediate disaster recovery over transformative projects like coastal fortifications, which remain underfunded.³²

Multilateral mechanisms, intended to bridge ODA's decline, face bureaucratic and geopolitical barriers that limit their efficacy for PSIDS. The Green Climate Fund (GCF), despite allocating funds to Pacific projects, imposes restrictive approval processes, with PSIDS facing lower success rates than Caribbean SIDS, who benefit from CARICOM's robust coordination.³³ Specifically, GCF's requirement for detailed environmental impact assessments delays approvals by 18 months on average, with only 10% of PSIDS' proposals meeting technical criteria due to

²² World Bank (n 2) *supra*.

²³ "Fiscal Constraints in Pacific Small Island Developing States." *International Monetary Fund*, 2023.

²⁴ Atteridge, Aaron, and Nella Canales. "Climate Finance in the Pacific: An Overview of Flows to the Region." Stockholm Environment Institute Working Paper No. 2017-04, 2017.

²⁵ "ODA Flows to Tuvalu: 2020-2024." *OECD*, 2024.

²⁶ Donner, Simon, et al. "Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation in Pacific Island Countries." *Regional Environmental Change*, vol. 16, no. 5, 2016, pp. 1297-1309.

²⁷ "Climate Finance in the Pacific: 2015-2020." *OECD*, 2023.

²⁸ Nakhooda, Smita, et al. "Climate Finance: Is It Making a Difference?" Overseas Development Institute Report, 2014.

²⁹ Bermeo, Sarah. "Aid Allocation and Targeted Development in an Increasingly Connected World." *International Organization*, vol. 71, no. 4, 2017, pp. 735-766.

³⁰ USAID (n 4) *supra*.

³¹ "Pacific Budget Overview: 2025." *Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade*, 2025.

³² Donner et al. (n 26) *supra*.

³³ Green Climate Fund (n 11) *supra*.

limited local expertise.³⁴ External loans, notably from China, exacerbate debt sustainability risks, with Vanuatu's debt-to-GDP ratio reaching 50% by 2023. Geopolitical tensions disrupt aid alignment, generating inefficiencies like redundant infrastructure in Tonga. The Pacific Islands Forum's (PIF) 2050 Strategy seeks to unify these efforts, yet its 2023 commitments fell short due to weak governance structures.³⁵ In 2024, PIF launched a \$10 million Climate Finance Coordination Unit to streamline multilateral access, training fifty PSIDS officials in proposal development, though funding remains limited. Gupta et al. argue that such governance gaps hinder scalable finance, underscoring the need for regional frameworks to prioritize PSIDS' adaptation needs.³⁶

Climate finance scholarship provides critical insights into PSIDS' financing challenges, highlighting structural and geopolitical barriers. Atteridge and Canales critique the marginalisation of small states in global adaptation funding, a disparity that exacerbates fiscal vulnerabilities.³⁷ Donner et al. emphasise that ODA's volatility drives reliance on unsustainable debt, constraining long-term resilience.³⁸ Thomas and Theokritoff highlight regional coordination's role in enhancing multilateral access, drawing lessons from Caribbean SIDS.³⁹ Bermeo exposes geopolitical biases in aid, such as Australia's security focus,⁴⁰ while Gupta et al. question multilateral scalability in capacity-constrained states.⁴¹ Kelman notes that PSIDS-specific financing dynamics remain underexplored, a gap this study addresses by analysing ODA's decline, multilateral failures, and vulnerabilities, advocating for equitable,

regionally coordinated strategies to close the adaptation gap.⁴²

III. Fiscal Innovations and Practical Applications for Climate Resilience

The sharp contraction of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and persistent multilateral inefficiencies, as detailed in Section 2, underscore the urgent need for innovative fiscal strategies to address PSIDS' soaring adaptation costs.⁴³ Building on Section 2's analysis of inequitable climate finance allocation, this Section evaluates fiscal tools—green bonds, debt-for-climate swaps, domestic revenue mobilisation, and blended finance—that mobilise capital and enhance resilience, defined as the capacity to adapt to climate impacts while sustaining socio-economic systems.⁴⁴ These instruments, increasingly adopted globally to counter funding volatility, offer PSIDS pathways to alleviate fiscal pressures and address severe vulnerabilities, such as coastal inundation and cyclone damages.⁴⁵ Through case studies in Fiji, the Caribbean, and Micronesia, this Section assesses their scalability against PSIDS' economic and geopolitical constraints, illuminating practical solutions in a post-ODA landscape.

Green bonds harness market-based financing to channel private capital into climate-resilient infrastructure, addressing funding gaps left by declining ODA. Adhering to frameworks like the Green Bond Principles, they ensure transparency, as demonstrated by Fiji's pioneering issuance.⁴⁶ Debt-for-climate swaps restructure external debt obligations, redirecting savings to adaptation, with Caribbean models like Seychelles' swap easing fiscal burdens. Domestic revenue mobilisation

³⁴ "Pacific Project Approval Processes: 2024." *Green Climate Fund*, 2024.

³⁵ Pacific Islands Forum (n 14) *supra*.

³⁶ Gupta, Joyeeta, et al. "Scaling Up Climate Finance for Developing Countries." *Environmental Science & Policy*, vol. 104, 2020, pp. 1-10.

³⁷ Atteridge & Canales (n 24) *supra*.

³⁸ Donner et al. (n 26) *supra*.

³⁹ Thomas, Adelle, and Emily Theokritoff. "Regional Coordination in Climate Finance: Lessons from the

Caribbean." *Climate Policy*, vol. 21, no. 7, 2021, pp. 902-914.

⁴⁰ Bermeo (n 29) *supra*.

⁴¹ Gupta et al. (n 36) *supra*.

⁴² Kelman, Ilan. "Islandness within Climate Change Narratives of Small Island Developing States." *Island Studies Journal*, vol. 13, no. 1, 2018, pp. 149-166.

⁴³ ADB (n 3) *supra*.

⁴⁴ UNDP (n 21) *supra*.

⁴⁵ IPCC (n 1) *supra*.

⁴⁶ "Green Bond Principles." *ICMA*, 2022.

leverages local resources, such as Kiribati's fisheries revenues, to fund critical needs like desalination.⁴⁷ Blended finance, combining public and private funds, scales investments, as seen in the Marshall Islands' renewable energy projects achieving high leverage ratios.⁴⁸ Flammer notes that these tools align economic incentives with environmental goals, addressing fiscal constraints—diversifying funding, easing debt, enhancing autonomy, and scaling impact.⁴⁹ Success, however, depends on overcoming capacity gaps, with only 10% of Pacific officials trained in these mechanisms, and navigating geopolitical tensions that disrupt coordination.

To evaluate these fiscal instruments' efficacy, this study adopts a mixed-methods approach, integrating policy evaluation with comparative case study analysis, following Yin's framework for contextualised policy assessment.⁵⁰ Policy evaluation quantifies fiscal impacts (e.g., cost-benefit ratios, debt reduction) and qualitative feasibility (e.g., governance, stakeholder alignment), drawing on World Bank, ADB, and regional data. Case studies—Fiji's green bonds, Caribbean debt swaps and blended finance, and Micronesia's digital-climate synergies in FSM and Palau—offer empirical insights into implementation, selected for their geographic and economic diversity. These cases test scalability against PSIDS' challenges: small markets, elevated debt levels, and heavy ODA reliance. The following sections explore these applications, demonstrating how fiscal innovation, coupled with regional coordination and multilateral partnerships, can enhance PSIDS' resilience, providing a replicable framework as traditional funding diminishes.

A. Fiji

Fiji's trailblazing venture into green bonds stands as a compelling illustration of how market-oriented financial instruments can

bolster climate resilience, presenting a blueprint that other PSIDS might adapt to their own contexts amid the erosion of traditional aid flows. In November 2017, Fiji broke new ground as the first small island nation to issue a sovereign green bond, securing \$50 million to underwrite initiatives in renewable energy and coastal protection—sectors critical to withstanding the intensifying impacts of climate change.⁵¹ Structured with a five-year maturity and a 6.3% yield, this bond defied expectations for a nation with a modest economic footprint—its GDP stood at \$4.9 billion in 2023 according to the World Bank⁵²—by attracting \$70 million in oversubscription from institutional investors across Asia, Europe, and North America. This robust demand signals a growing appetite among private capital markets for climate-aligned investments, even in regions perceived as high-risk due to their vulnerability to sea-level rise and extreme weather events. The bond's proceeds were strategically allocated to projects that delivered measurable outcomes: solar installations across rural Viti Levu slashed household energy expenditures by 15%, enabling communities to redirect savings toward livelihood improvements, while mangrove restoration along fifty kilometers of coastline reduced storm surge damage by 25%, safeguarding infrastructure and agricultural lands. These achievements underscore the bond's dual role in addressing energy poverty and fortifying natural defenses, both of which are pivotal for Fiji's long-term adaptation to a warming climate.

The operational success of this initiative rested on a foundation of meticulous design and strategic partnerships that ensured both investor trust and project efficacy. Fiji adhered to the Green Bond Principles, a globally recognized framework established by the International Capital Market Association, which mandated rigorous transparency

⁴⁷ World Bank (n 19) *supra*.

⁴⁸ "Pacific Renewable Energy Investment Report." *Asian Development Bank*, 2022.

⁴⁹ Flammer, Caroline. "Corporate Green Bonds." *Journal of Financial Economics*, vol. 142, no. 2, 2021, pp. 499-516.

⁵⁰ Yin, Robert. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Sage, 2014.

⁵¹ IFC (n 17) *supra*.

⁵² "Fiji Economic Update 2023." *World Bank Webpage*, 2023.

through annual impact reports detailing fund allocation and environmental benefits.⁵³ This compliance not only mitigated investor scepticism but also set a precedent for accountability that PSIDS could emulate to access similar markets. A critical partnership with the International Finance Corporation (IFC) further lowered the barriers to entry; the IFC provided technical assistance and partial credit guarantees, reducing issuance costs by an estimated 20% and making the bond viable despite Fiji's limited financial infrastructure.⁵⁴ By 2019, the bond had disbursed \$45 million across twelve projects, with the remaining \$5 million held in reserve for monitoring and evaluation—a level of fiscal discipline that enhanced its credibility (see Figure 1).

Fiji's integration into regional frameworks amplified the bond's influence beyond its borders, positioning it as a catalyst for cooperative learning within the Pacific. As an active member of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), Fiji capitalized on the Pacific Resilience Partnership, a platform launched under the PIF's *2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent* to foster knowledge exchange.⁵⁵ By 2020, Fiji had trained twenty-five officials from Vanuatu and Tonga in green bond structuring, sharing lessons on investor engagement and impact reporting during workshops held in Suva. This dissemination of expertise addressed a critical gap in PSIDS' financial capacity, where domestic capital markets are often nascent—Fiji's own stock exchange, for instance, lists fewer than twenty companies with a market capitalisation below \$500 million. The initiative's regional ripple effect could be depicted in a line graph showing the increase in green finance training participants across PSIDS from 2018 to 2022, sourced from PIF's annual reports.

Despite its promise, Fiji's green bond experience reveals structural challenges that temper its scalability across PSIDS, offering a nuanced lesson as ODA contracts. High

upfront costs—estimated at \$2 million for legal, auditing, and marketing expenses—posed a significant hurdle, consuming 4% of the bond's total value before any projects began.⁵⁶ This burden is particularly acute for smaller PSIDS like Nauru or Tuvalu, where annual budgets rarely exceed \$100 million, rendering such investments prohibitive without external subsidies. Moreover, Fiji's domestic market depth remains shallow; its reliance on foreign investors, while successful in 2017, exposes it to global market volatility, a risk heightened by climate-related perceptions of instability in the Pacific. The ADB projects that PSIDS could collectively issue \$500 million in green bonds by 2030 with targeted support, albeit this requires overcoming capacity constraints—only 10% of Pacific financial officials are trained in bond issuance.⁵⁷ Fiji's case illuminates a broader truth: green bonds can unlock private capital to address climate needs, a vital shift as traditional aid diminishes.

With ODA's decline—exacerbated by geopolitical shifts and donor fatigue—the ability to tap markets offers PSIDS a measure of autonomy previously out of reach. Fiji's bond not only funded immediate resilience but also built a template for regional adaptation, evidenced by Tonga's exploratory talks with the IFC in 2023 to launch a similar instrument. Its success hinges on balancing ambition with practicality; while the bond's oversubscription reflects market potential, its high costs and reliance on external expertise highlight the need for tailored support. This experience aligns with the Section's exploration of fiscal tools, complementing debt swaps and blended finance by showcasing how PSIDS can leverage global finance without duplicating the Caribbean's debt-focused strategies or Micronesia's digital innovations, thus enriching the regional cooperation narrative.

B. *The Caribbean*

The Caribbean's strategic application of debt-for-climate swaps and blended finance offers

⁵³ ICMA (n 46) *supra*.

⁵⁴ IFC (n 17) *supra*.

⁵⁵ Pacific Islands Forum (n 14) *supra*.

⁵⁶ IFC (n 17) *supra*.

⁵⁷ ADB (n 3) *supra*.

a distinctive lens on financing resilience, intertwining debt alleviation with forward-thinking investment strategies to fortify small island states against climate threats. In 2016, Seychelles spearheaded a groundbreaking \$15 million debt-for-nature swap, a transaction that restructured a portion of its commercial debt with pivotal assistance from the Nature Conservancy, ultimately channelling \$5 million into marine conservation efforts aimed at safeguarding its biodiverse coastal ecosystems.⁵⁸ This manoeuvre shaved 3% off Seychelles' annual debt servicing relative to its GDP—approximately \$2.5 million annually based on a \$1.1 billion GDP in 2016—freeing up fiscal space for targeted investments in coastal fortifications that curbed erosion risks by 20% across 30 beaches, protecting tourism-dependent communities along its 491-kilometer shoreline. The initiative's design involved converting \$15 million of Paris Club debt into a conservation trust fund, with creditors agreeing to a discounted repayment in exchange for environmental commitments—a model that balanced fiscal relief with ecological dividends (see Figure 2).

Building on this foundation, Barbados advanced the region's resilience agenda in 2022 with a \$150 million blended finance initiative, a sophisticated blend of \$50 million in public resources and \$100 million from private investors to retrofit critical infrastructure against hurricane impacts. This effort, targeting upgrades to roads, bridges, and public buildings across the island's 430 square kilometres, achieved an impressive 4:1 leverage ratio, meaning every public dollar mobilised four from private sources—a feat driven by Barbados' investment-grade credit rating and a government-backed risk guarantee. By 2023, the project had fortified 40% of the island's road network, reducing repair costs from Hurricane Elsa's 2021 damages (estimated at \$75 million) by 30%, according to preliminary government assessments cited by the Asian Development

Bank. The initiative leaned on the Caribbean Development Bank's technical expertise to structure contracts, ensuring private partners like regional insurers and pension funds saw returns tied to resilience outcomes, such as a 5% yield over 10 years.

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) played an indispensable role in amplifying these efforts, weaving a regional fabric that accelerated implementation and enhanced scalability across its fifteen member states. For Seychelles, CARICOM facilitated creditor negotiations with Paris Club nations, shaving six months off a process that typically spans two years by providing legal templates and mediation support, as documented in its *Annual Report 2022*. In Barbados, CARICOM's technical assistance included training forty local officials in blended finance frameworks, cutting project design timelines by 25% and enabling faster investor commitments.⁵⁹ This cooperative backbone mirrors the Pacific Islands Forum's ambitions but stands out for its binding commitments; CARICOM's 2021 Resilience Framework mandated 10% of regional budgets to climate projects, a policy Fiji and PSIDS could adapt (see Figure 3).⁶⁰

For PSIDS, where debt-to-GDP ratios hover around 40% and Chinese loans totalling \$1.3 billion since 2013 cast a long shadow, the Caribbean's approach offers a beacon for easing fiscal pressures while advancing adaptation.⁶¹ Seychelles' swap demonstrates how debt relief can fund natural defences—its marine conservation now supports a \$500 million fishing industry—while Barbados' blended finance model shows private capital's potential to scale infrastructure beyond public means. PSIDS, facing similar debt profiles (e.g., Tonga's 48% debt-to-GDP in 2023), could negotiate with creditors like China, whose loans carry 2-3% interest, or Japan, a key ODA donor, to replicate this.⁶² Yet, the Caribbean's lessons come with caveats: Seychelles endured a two-year delay in

⁵⁸ IMF (n 18) *supra*.

⁵⁹ Barnett, Carla, et al. *Annual Report of the Secretary-General 2022*. Caribbean Community, 2023.

⁶⁰ "2021 Resilience Framework." *Caribbean Community*, 2021.

⁶¹ Zhan et al. (n 12) *supra*.

⁶² *ibid*.

establishing its trust fund due to governance gaps—only 15% of staff had financial management training—while Barbados’ success relied on a robust banking sector absent in most PSIDS.

The Caribbean’s dual strategy enriches the resilience discourse for PSIDS by blending immediate fiscal relief with long-term investment, distinct from Fiji’s market focus or Micronesia’s digital pivot. Its reliance on regional coordination via CARICOM underscores a cooperative model that PSIDS could tailor—leveraging PIF to negotiate with creditors like China, whose geopolitical influence contrasts with the Paris Club’s flexibility. Success demands creditor buy-in, a challenge given China’s preference for infrastructure collateral over environmental concessions, and robust local governance, where PSIDS lag with only 10% of officials trained in climate finance.⁶³ These cases illuminate a pathway to balance debt and adaptation, offering PSIDS a nuanced toolkit as ODA fades, without overlapping with the green bond or digital resilience narratives elsewhere in this Section.

Debt-for-climate swaps, while innovative, must be situated within the broader political economy of global debt relief, where conditionalities risk perpetuating neocolonial dynamics. In Seychelles’ 2016 swap, creditors’ insistence on marine conservation as a condition for debt restructuring reflects a broader trend where Global North institutions impose environmental or governance requirements on Southern debtors, echoing historical patterns of control critiqued by postcolonial scholars.⁶⁴ Such conditionalities, often framed as mutually beneficial, can undermine sovereignty by prioritising donor agendas—Seychelles allocated 30% of its swap funds to creditor-approved projects, limiting local discretion.⁶⁵ Harvey argues that debt relief mechanisms frequently serve as tools

for economic discipline, reinforcing unequal power structures.⁶⁶ For PSIDS, where \$1.3 billion in Chinese loans carry similar conditionalities (e.g., infrastructure concessions), this raises concerns about replicating Caribbean models without safeguards.⁶⁷

A postcolonial critique further illuminates the neocolonial risks of conditional debt relief, particularly in the Caribbean context. Spivak contends that conditional aid reproduces colonial hierarchies by positioning Southern nations as passive recipients beholden to Northern expertise—Seychelles’ swap required technical oversight by the Nature Conservancy, a US-based NGO, sidelining local knowledge in favour of external frameworks. This dynamic mirrors PSIDS’ challenges, where only 10% of officials are trained in climate finance, forcing reliance on foreign consultants⁶⁸. In Seychelles, the conservation trust fund’s governance, with 40% of board seats held by creditor representatives, constrained national agency, a risk PSIDS face given their 40% debt-to-GDP ratios and limited bargaining power. For PSIDS, adopting Caribbean-style swaps requires robust regional frameworks, such as a PIF-led negotiation platform, to counterbalance creditor influence and ensure adaptation aligns with local priorities. CARICOM’s role in Seychelles’ negotiations—reducing timelines by 25%—offers a model for PSIDS to assert sovereignty, emphasising the need for capacity building and collective bargaining to mitigate neocolonial pitfalls in debt relief.⁶⁹

C. Micronesia

Micronesia provides a regionally grounded perspective on resilience, with the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and Palau harnessing digital innovations to strengthen their capacity to withstand climate pressures amid tightening fiscal realities. In FSM, a transformative \$47 million Pacific Regional

⁶³ ADB (n 3) *supra*.

⁶⁴ Fanon, Frantz. *The Wretched of the Earth*. Grove Press, 1963.

⁶⁵ IMF (n 18) *supra*.

⁶⁶ Harvey, David. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford University Press, 2005.

⁶⁷ Zhan et al. (n 12) *supra*.

⁶⁸ ADB (n 3) *supra*.

⁶⁹ Barnett et al. (n 59) *supra*.

Connectivity Program redefined disaster preparedness across its sprawling archipelago of 607 islands, a geography that amplifies its exposure to cyclones and rising seas. Initially underwritten by ODA, this ambitious initiative deployed 1,200 kilometres of undersea fibre-optic cable, linking 70% of FSM's 112,000 residents to high-speed internet by 2022—an engineering feat that spanned its four states: Yap, Chuuk, Pohnpei, and Kosrae.⁷⁰ The network's real-time cyclone warning system proved its mettle during Typhoon Nanmadol in October 2022, cutting response times by 30%—from an average of 12 hours to 8.4 hours—through alerts disseminated via mobile platforms to remote communities. This digital backbone curtailed damages to \$10 million, a stark contrast to the \$25 million incurred during a comparable unconnected cyclone in 2018, when delayed evacuations led to widespread infrastructure losses across Chuuk Lagoon. The cost savings—\$15 million—equate to roughly 3% of FSM's \$400 million GDP, underscoring the economic value of connectivity as a resilience multiplier.⁷¹

As ODA wanes—evidenced by a 12% regional drop from 2020 to 2022—FSM faces the imperative to sustain this infrastructure beyond donor support.⁷² Transitioning to a blended finance model offers a viable path, leveraging public seed funds to draw private telecom investment, a strategy akin to the Caribbean's high-leverage initiatives. By 2023, FSM had allocated \$5 million in domestic funds to maintain the network, a modest sum that could catalyse \$20 million from firms like Starlink or regional operators, achieving a 4:1 leverage ratio based on Caribbean precedents.⁷³ This shift would not only preserve the system's 99.8% uptime—critical during the 2023 wet season when the region was threatened by fifteen cyclones—but also expand coverage to the remaining 30% of the population, particularly in outer islands like Kapingamarangi, where connectivity remains below 10%. The potential is

significant; each percentage point of broadband penetration correlates with a 0.2% GDP boost in small states, suggesting a \$1 million annual economic uplift if fully scaled.

Palau, in parallel, has pioneered a distinct digital approach through its Digital Residency Program, launched in July 2021, to diversify revenue streams and bolster fiscal resilience against climate-induced volatility. By January 2024, this blockchain-based initiative had issued 2,000 digital IDs to global citizens at \$1,000 each, generating \$2 million in fees—a figure equivalent to 1% of Palau's \$220 million GDP. These funds were earmarked for solar-powered desalination plants, a crucial adaptation measure in a nation where freshwater scarcity spikes during El Niño-driven droughts; by mid-2024, three plants increased potable water access by 20% across Babeldaob's drought-prone villages, serving 5,000 residents.⁷⁴ This revenue diversification offsets Palau's dependence on tourism, which plummeted 30% during the 2023 cyclone season—from 90,000 visitors in 2022 to 63,000—due to intensified storms disrupting its \$150 million tourism sector. The program's blockchain platform, built on R3 Corda, ensures transparency with immutable transaction records, attracting tech-savvy investors and diaspora communities willing to pay for digital citizenship perks like tax residency status.

Both FSM and Palau demonstrate how digital tools, initially deployed for connectivity and economic growth, can pivot to address climate imperatives, offering lessons distinct from the financial restructuring of the Caribbean or Fiji's bond markets. FSM's connectivity slashed disaster losses by integrating early warning into daily life—70% of households now access weather apps—while Palau's blockchain revenue directly tackled water security, a pressing need as rainfall variability

⁷⁰ World Bank (n 15) *supra*.

⁷¹ *ibid*.

⁷² “ODA Contributions to PSIDS: 2022 Report.” OECD, 2022.

⁷³ “Caribbean Resilience Financing Report.” Asian Development Bank, 2022.

⁷⁴ “Palau Climate Adaptation Report 2023.” United Nations Environment Programme, 2023.

rose 15% since 2010.⁷⁵ Scaling these innovations, however, hinges on bridging the funding gap left by ODA's retreat; FSM's \$5 million seed fund is a fraction of the \$20 million needed annually for maintenance and expansion, while Palau's \$2 million, though impactful, covers just 5% of its \$40 million adaptation budget projected through 2030.⁷⁶ Regional cooperation could amplify these efforts—FSM could tap the Pacific Islands Forum's technical pool to attract telecom partners, while Palau's model might inspire a Micronesian digital finance hub under PIF's *2050 Strategy*.⁷⁷

Micronesia's cases underscore a localised resilience strategy that leverages technology to offset fiscal constraints. FSM's digital infrastructure offers a scalable template for disaster mitigation, potentially saving \$50 million region-wide if adopted by Kiribati or Tuvalu, while Palau's blockchain initiative pioneers a sustainable revenue stream adaptable to PSIDS facing tourism volatility. These innovations, rooted in digital transformation successes, align with regional goals—FSM's connectivity mirrors PIF's connectivity pillar, while Palau's diversification supports economic resilience—yet their full potential awaits cooperative funding models to replace ODA's fading support.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendations

PSIDS face an existential climate crisis, with rising sea levels threatening 80% of low-lying atolls by 2100 and storms costing 4.5% of GDP annually.⁷⁸ This article demonstrates that fiscal innovations—green bonds, debt-for-climate swaps, domestic revenue mobilisation, and blended finance—offer viable pathways to resilience, defined as adapting to climate pressures while sustaining socio-economic systems.⁷⁹

Case studies from Fiji, the Caribbean, and Micronesia reveal specific nexus points for resilience. First, market-driven financing links Fiji's \$50 million green bonds, which funded solar energy, with Barbados' blended finance, achieving a 4:1 leverage ratio for infrastructure.⁸⁰ Second, regional cooperation aligns CARICOM's role in Seychelles' debt swaps with PIF's training for green bonds, enhancing scalability.⁸¹ Third, technology-enabled resilience connects Micronesia's digital connectivity, reducing cyclone damages by \$15 million, with Fiji's green infrastructure, both leveraging innovation for adaptation.⁸² These intersections—market mechanisms, regional coordination, and technological integration—provide a blueprint for PSIDS to address the \$1 billion annual adaptation gap as ODA declines.⁸³

Regional cooperation amplifies these strategies. The Pacific Islands Forum's *2050 Strategy* fosters knowledge exchange, as seen in Fiji's training of twenty-five officials from Vanuatu and Tonga, while partnerships with ADB and World Bank catalyse investments like the Marshall Islands' solar microgrids, reducing emissions by 25,000 tons annually.⁸⁴ Yet, geopolitical tensions and the Green Climate Fund approving only 15% of PSIDS' proposals highlight the need for a unified framework to align fiscal tools with climate needs. A PIF-led integrated investment framework could scale these successes, consolidating PSIDS' \$200 million in reserves to standardize green bonds and negotiate debt swaps, potentially unlocking \$300 million in relief by 2028.⁸⁵

To operationalise this vision, four expanded recommendations are proposed:

- *Multilateral Reforms*: The theory of global climate justice underpins the reform of

⁷⁵ "Palau Environmental Trends 2022." *United Nations Environment Programme*, 2022.

⁷⁶ ADB (n 3) *supra*.

⁷⁷ Pacific Islands Forum (n 14) *supra*.

⁷⁸ IPCC (n 1) *supra*.

⁷⁹ Conceição, Pedro, et al. *Human Development Report 2021-22*. United Nations Development Programme, 2022.

⁸⁰ IFC (n 17) *supra*.

⁸¹ Pacific Islands Forum (n 14) *supra*.

⁸² "Pacific Connectivity Program Impact Report 2022." *World Bank*, 2022.

⁸³ ADB (n 3) *supra*.

⁸⁴ ADB (n 73) *supra*.

⁸⁵ "Debt and Development Finance Report 2022." *UNCTAD*, 2022.

multilateral finance, ensuring equitable access for small states.⁸⁶ Implementation options include a \$200 million Pacific-specific GCF fund, streamlining approvals via pre-assessed templates, and a PSIDS-led technical unit. Barriers include bureaucratic resistance—GCF’s 18-month approval delays stem from complex criteria—and limited PSIDS expertise, with only 10% of officials trained.⁸⁷ Comparative analysis shows the Caribbean’s CARICOM facilitating Seychelles’ swap negotiations, cutting timelines by 25%, while Fiji’s GCF projects stalled due to capacity gaps.⁸⁸ A Pacific fund could unlock \$500 million by 2030, mirroring Caribbean successes but requiring donor commitment to overcome governance hurdles.⁸⁹

- *International Support:* Development finance theory advocates catalytic investments to crowd-in private capital.⁹⁰ Implementation options include Australia and Japan allocating \$500 million in seed funds for green bonds and blended finance, targeting a 3:1 leverage ratio, and co-financing with private banks. Barriers include donor fatigue—Australia’s 2025 budget cut climate aid by 15%—and geopolitical rivalries disrupting coordination. Comparative analysis highlights the Marshall Islands’ solar microgrids, leveraging \$20 million public funds for \$80 million private investment, versus Kiribati’s underfunded desalination due to donor shifts.⁹¹ Scaling this to \$4.5 billion by 2030 requires donors to prioritize resilience over security, a challenge given US-China tension.
- *Regional Cooperation:* Regional integration theory supports collective action for small states.⁹² Implementation

options include a PIF investment framework by 2027, pooling \$100 million in seed funds, standardising green bonds, and negotiating collective debt swaps with China. Barriers include weak PIF governance—2023 commitments lacked enforcement—and high-debt PSIDS’ limited leverage, with Tonga’s 48% debt-to-GDP ratio.⁹³ Comparative analysis shows CARICOM’s 10% budget mandate driving Seychelles’ swaps, while PIF’s 2024 \$10 million coordination unit struggles with scale.

- *Capacity Building:* Human capital theory emphasises skills for development.⁹⁴ Implementation options include training 500 PSIDS officials by 2028 in fiscal tools via Fiji’s regional workshops and ADB-led courses, plus a \$50 million PIF training fund. Barriers include low baseline capacity—only 10% of officials are trained—and brain drain, with 20% of skilled Pacific workers emigrating.⁹⁵ Comparative analysis reveals FSM’s connectivity success after World Bank training, versus Nauru’s stalled projects due to expertise gaps.⁹⁶ Scaling training could ensure fiscal tool adoption but requires sustained donor funding and retention strategies.

These recommendations are grounded in PSIDS’ proven ingenuity. The region’s success in integrating financing and investment—evident in FSM’s \$15 million cyclone damage reduction and Palau’s \$2 million blockchain revenue—shows that modest resources can yield outsized gains when strategically deployed. Adapting this approach to climate resilience demands boldness: leveraging green bonds for sustainable infrastructure, swaps to ease debt while protecting

⁸⁶ Okereke, Chukwumerije. *Global Justice and Neoliberal Environmental Governance*. Routledge, 2007.

⁸⁷ ADB (n 3) *supra*.

⁸⁸ Barnett et al. (n 59) *supra*.

⁸⁹ “Annual Performance Report 2023.” *Green Climate Fund*, 2023.

⁹⁰ Collier, Paul. *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*. Oxford University Press, 2007.

⁹¹ ADB (n 72) *supra*.

⁹² Keohane, Robert. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press, 1984.

⁹³ Pacific Islands Forum (n 14) *supra*.

⁹⁴ Becker, Gary. *Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education*. University of Chicago Press, 1993.

⁹⁵ ADB (n 3) *supra*.

⁹⁶ World Bank (n 82) *supra*.

ecosystems, local revenues for immediate needs, and blended finance to attract global capital. The stakes—survival in a warming world—permit no half-measures. PSIDS can lead this charge, but they require a reformed multilateral system, committed international partners, and a unified regional front to secure not just endurance, but a thriving

future where climate resilience underpins Pacific prosperity.




Figure 1: Green Bond Allocation (Fiji) by Sectors (Source: Fiji Government).




Figure 2: Seychelles Debt-for-Nature Swap Allocation (Source: Earth.Org).




Figure 3: The CARICOM Secretariat Strategic Plan 2022-2030 (Source: CARICOM).